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Note
The Implications of Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com
on Copyright Registration
LAUREN N. ROSS
This Note addresses the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision, Fourth
Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, and analyzes the Court’s decision
in light of the relevant sections of the Copyright Act, the underlying circuit split,
briefs submitted to the Court, and the oral argument before the Supreme Court. This
Note argues that in response to the Supreme Court’s decision, Congress should
amend the Copyright Act to codify the special handling process in order to create a
semi-conditional copyright registration system.
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The Implications of Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com
on Copyright Registration
LAUREN N. ROSS *
INTRODUCTION
The copyright system is comprised of “procedural mechanisms, referred
to collectively as ‘copyright formalities.’”1 Through the Copyright Acts of
1909 and 1976, Congress moved the copyright system away from formalities
by relaxing many of the requirements with which artists and creators needed
to comply.2 However, registration has remained a requirement under the
Copyright Act (the “Act”).3 The United States Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com, which requires the Register of
Copyrights to act on a copyright owner’s application for registration before
a civil action may commence,4 resolved a long-standing circuit split
surrounding copyright registration5 and signals a shift back towards a
copyright system predicated on formalities.
The Act automatically grants copyright protection to an original work
without any action on behalf of the creator.6 “[T]he Copyright Act
safeguards copyright owners, irrespective of registration, by vesting them
with exclusive rights upon creation of their works and prohibiting
infringement from that point forward.”7 While the Act provides copyright
owners a shield, restricting how others may use an original work, creators
are not automatically provided a sword, or remedies, to protect their works.
In order to pursue a civil action against an infringer, the work must be
registered with the Copyright Office.8 Since the copyright system must
*
University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. 2020. I would like to thank Professor Steven Wilf
and the Connecticut Law Review.
1
Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 487 (2004).
2
See Sprigman, supra note 1, at 493–94 (noting that the 1909 Act lengthened the renewal term and
“softened” the registration requirement to some degree).
3
Jessica Litman, Argument Preview: When Has Registration of a Copyright Claim “Been Made”?,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 3, 2019, 10:10 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/01/argument-previewwhen-has-registration-of-a-copyright-claim-been-made/ (“Congress has significantly relaxed the
formalities required for copyright protection, but it has retained registration as a key part of the legal
regime.”).
4
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2019).
5
2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.16(B)(3)(b)(iii) (2018).
6
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (affording protection when the work is fixed in a tangible medium).
7
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 891. This exclusive bundle of rights includes
reproduction, preparation of derivative works, distribution, performance, and recording. § 106.
8
§ 411(a).
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9

balance important rights and exceptions, owners of original works need to
register with the Copyright Office to take advantage of these exclusive
rights. However, the definition of “registration” was not clearly articulated
by the Court until its decision in Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com.
Ultimately, the Act has not worked in a manner Congress likely
intended.10 The internet allows for the dissemination of more information
than ever before and has made copying even easier.11 Additionally, delays
within the Copyright Office have detrimentally impacted the effectiveness
of the Office, thereby impeding the purpose of the Act. Copyright owners
need a system that ensures not only that their works are protected, but also
provides them with remedies that allow them to recover against infringers
without unnecessary obstacles or delays.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Fourth Estate v.
Wall-Street.com with the purpose of resolving the circuit split regarding
when registration occurs under section 411(a) of the Act.12 The relevant
portion of section 411(a) states:
[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in any
United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or
registration of the copyright claim has been made in
accordance with this title. In any case, however, where the
deposit, application, and fee required for registration have
been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form and
registration has been refused, the applicant is entitled to
institute a civil action for infringement if notice thereof, with
a copy of the complaint, is served on the Register of
Copyrights. The Register may, at his or her option, become a
party to the action with respect to the issue of
registrability . . . .13
The Court contemplated the meaning of “registration” within section
411(a) of the Act and considered:
[w]hether “registration of [a] copyright claim has been made”
within the meaning of § 411(a) when the copyright holder
9

THE DEP’T OF COMMERCE INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, WHITE PAPER ON REMIXES, FIRST
SALE, AND STATUTORY DAMAGES: COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY i (2016).
10
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 892 (“[T]he statutory scheme [of the Act] has not
worked as Congress likely envisioned.”).
11
KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF ECONOMY: HOW IMITATION
SPARKS INNOVATION 68 (2012); see also Sprigman, supra note 1, at 489 (contending that Congress could
not predict how the growth of the internet would impact the copyright system and Congress did not
consider this when removing many of the formalities from the copyright regime).
12
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 887.
13
17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012).
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delivers the required application, deposit, and fee to the
Copyright Office, as the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have held, or
only once the Copyright Office acts on that application, as the
Tenth Circuit and, in the decision below, the Eleventh Circuit
have held.14
The Court’s unanimous decision, written by Justice Ginsburg, ended the
long-standing circuit split on copyright registration.15 The Court held “that
‘registration . . . has been made’ within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)
not when an application for registration is filed, but when the Register has
registered a copyright after examining a properly filed application.”16 While
this decision resolved the conflicting interpretations of the term
“registration,” it is a fundamentally unjust decision and will inevitably create
several obstacles for copyright owners seeking to protect their works against
infringers.
This Note will examine the Supreme Court’s decision in Fourth Estate
v. Wall-Street.com and argue that the adoption of the registration approach
is a shift back towards a copyright system based on formalities, which will
result in an adverse and inequitable system for copyright owners. As a result,
Congress should amend the Act to create a semi-conditional registration
system that incorporates the Copyright Office’s special handling process.
The first section of this Note will briefly describe the formal requirements
mandated by early iterations of the Act and the relevant sections of the
modern Act that pertain to registration. The second section will analyze the
circuit split that led to the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in this case
and the history of Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com. The third section will
consider the briefs and oral arguments submitted by each party to the
Supreme Court. The fourth section will focus on the Supreme Court’s
decision and the likely consequences of the decision. The fifth section will
present a possible solution through the adoption of a semi-conditional
copyright system.
I. THE COPYRIGHT ACT
The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the authority “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”17 Through this grant of power, Congress enacted the

14

Brief for Petitioner at i, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct.
881 (2019) (No. 17-571) (citation omitted).
15
2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.16(B)(3)(b)(iii) (2018).
16
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 892.
17
U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Copyright Act. The Act requires creators to comply with several
procedural requirements, or formalities, in order to obtain full copyright
protection.19 The copyright system can function in two ways: in an
unconditional system, which “grants protection whether or not the work is
registered, marked, or renewed,” or in a conditional system, which requires
the author or creator to take affirmative steps to protect their works.20
A. The Evolution of the Copyright Act
The first copyright legislation adopted by Congress, the Copyright Act
of 1790, imposed strict formalities that only granted rights to authors in the
United States.21 Unlike the current system, copyright protection was not
automatically granted under the first Act.22 Instead, authors were required to
comply with several strict formalities, including registering their works with
district courts.23 Other formalities included providing notice and deposit, as
well as complying with renewal requirements.24 The revisions of the
Copyright Acts of 1909 and 1976, which relaxed several of these strict
formalities, began the shift to what Professor Sprigman refers to as an
“unconditional copyright” system.25
Over time, the legislature removed many of the formal requirements
imposed by previous iterations of the Act.26 Through the Copyright Act of
1976, “Congress pared back, and in some instances entirely discarded,
copyright formalities.”27 Through these acts the legislature adopted a more
flexible copyright system.28 However, registration has consistently been
required throughout iterations of copyright acts.

18

Guy A. Rub, A Less-Formalistic Copyright Preemption, 24 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 327, 329 (2017).
However, it remains unclear what actions taken by Congress “promote progress.” Sprigman, supra note
1, at 530.
19
Sprigman, supra note 1, at 528 (“[F]ormalities are an important component of our original
constitutional commitment to a utilitarian model of copyright.”).
20
Id. at 494.
21
Id. at 491–92.
22
Id. But see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012) (granting a work copyright protection when the work is
“fixed in any tangible medium of expression”).
23
Sprigman, supra note 1, at 492.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 493–94 (arguing that while still requiring registration, notice, and renewal, the registration
requirement was softened). Sprigman compares the “unconditional copyright” system to a “conditional
copyright” system, mandating these formal requirements. Id. at 494.
26
See, e.g., Arthur J. Levine & Jeffrey L. Squires, Notice, Deposit and Registration: The
Importance of Being Formal, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1232, 1239 (1977) (describing how to comply with
notice requirements under the modern Act and how these requirements differ from the 1909 Act).
27
Sprigman, supra note 1, at 487.
28
Levine & Squires, supra note 26, at 1236. “The provisions of . . . the 1976 Act are generally
intended to liberalize the rigid formalities which condition the acquisition of copyright under the old law,
and which have from time to time resulted in unintended forfeitures of copyright.” Id. at 1232.
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B. The Modern Copyright Act
The Act provides a bundle of exclusive rights to creators of original
literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic, pictorial, video, sound, and
architectural works.29 Section 102 of the Act automatically grants a work
copyright protection when the work is “fixed in any tangible medium of
expression.”30 The bundle of exclusive rights copyright owners are afforded
include the right to reproduce, prepare derivatives, perform, display, or
distribute copies of their work.31 These rights are granted regardless of
whether registration with the Copyright Office occurred.
Congress assigned the Copyright Office the important task of registering
copyright claims.32 Copyright registration is addressed in sections 408
through 412 of the Act.33 Sections 408 and 409 of the Act describe the
registration process and the required materials that creators must submit to
the Register of Copyrights.34 The Act is silent on what occurs in the period
of time between filing an application and when the Copyright Office
completes registration. Section 410 only speaks to what occurs after an
application for registration is examined or a work is registered.35 Copyright
owners remain in a “legal limbo” until the Copyright Office issues
registration or refuses an application for registration.36
Registration of a work with the Copyright Office is “not a condition of
copyright protection.”37 Section 408 states that a copyright owner may file
an application with the Copyright Office.38 The Register of Copyrights (the
“Register”) plays an important role in this process. The Register determines
the form that must be used and has the authority to grant or refuse
registration of any copyright claim filed.39 The Register also has the ability
29

17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
§ 102(a).
31
§ 106.
32
Registration Modernization, 83 Fed. Reg. 201 (proposed Oct. 17, 2018) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 201–02) (“Copyright registration provides essential benefits for copyright owners.”).
33
Section 101 of the Act defines “registration” as “a registration of a claim in the original or the
renewed and extended term of copyright.” 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). This definition is circular and does
not provide a clear resolution to when registration occurs.
34
17 U.S.C. §§ 408, 409 (2012) (requiring a deposit, application, and fee).
35
§ 410.
36
Jason S. Duey, What’s the Problem Money Can’t Solve?: Why Determining the Validity of a
Copyright Application Is a Clear Precondition to an Infringement Action, 39 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 555,
557 (2013) (describing legal limbo as the “time in space between delivering a validly complied copyright
application with the Copyright Office and the Register of Copyrights issuing, or refusing to issue, a
certificate of registration”). See infra Section V.A (explaining the consequences of “legal limbo”).
37
§ 408(a); 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.16(A)(1) (2018) (“[C]opyright automatically inheres in
a work the moment it is ‘created.’”).
38
§ 408(a) (requiring deposit, application, and fee). The Copyright Office defines “deposit” as a
copy “of the work to be registered for copyright.” Definitions, COPYRIGHT.GOV,
https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/definitions.html (last visited July 20, 2019).
39
§§ 409, 410.
30
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to become a party in an action regarding the registrability of a copyright
claim.40 Consequently, the Register’s decision to issue a certificate of
registration or deny an application can have significant implications on
pending litigation.41
It is important to note that the effective date of a copyright certificate is
not the date on which the Register determines whether the claim should be
approved or denied. Instead, the “effective date of a copyright registration is
the day on which an application, deposit, and fee . . . have all been received
in the Copyright Office.”42 This suggests that the date the application is filed
is more significant than the date the Register grants certification.
Section 411 of the Copyright Act requires a copyright holder to
preregister or register their work before an action for infringement may be
filed.43 Under section 408(f), “owners of works especially susceptible to
prepublication infringement should be allowed to institute suit before the
Register has granted or refused registration.”44 The language of this section
was pivotal in the Court’s decision in Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com.45
Some argue that the language of section 411 is clear: creators must
register with the Copyright Office before they can file a copyright
infringement suit.46 The Copyright Office takes this position.47 However,
others argue that the term “registration” is ambiguous,48 giving rise to the
circuit split and the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Fourth Estate v.
Wall-Street.com.

40

§ 411(a).
Marybeth Peters, The Copyright Office and the Formal Requirements of Registration of Claims
to Copyright, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 737, 739 (1992) (stating a certificate of registration may have a
great influence in litigation).
42
§ 410(d).
43
§ 411(a).
44
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2019). However,
neither the Supreme Court nor the Copyright Act explicitly suggest what types of work may be
preregistered.
45
For a discussion of this decision, see infra Section IV.
46
See, e.g., Duey, supra note 36, at 561 (“A copyright is registered only after the Copyright Office
first determines the validity of an application and issues a certificate of registration. . . . [T]he statute is
unambiguous . . . .”).
47
Registration Modernization, 83 Fed. Reg. 201 (proposed Oct. 17, 2018) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 201–02).
48
See, e.g., Emily B. Tate, Comment, No Public Benefits for Public Benefit: The Eleventh Circuit’s
Narrow Approach to Copyright Registration, 59 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 134, 135–36 (2018)
(“Section 411(a)’s fluid use of the word ‘registration’ has created tension in the courts, as the statute can
be construed to refer simultaneously to the entire act of registration . . . and to the single act of filing with
the Copyright Office . . . .”).
41
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II. THE HISTORY OF FOURTH ESTATE V. WALL-STREET.COM AND THE
CIRCUIT SPLIT
The long-standing circuit split surrounding copyright registration was
imperative in the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari,49 and without the
Court’s review of this issue, it was unlikely that the circuit split would have
been resolved.50 There were formerly two approaches taken by circuit courts
regarding copyright registration. The first was the registration approach,
adopted by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits.51 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits
adopted the application approach.52 The circuit split was the result of courts
interpreting the same, precise language of the Copyright Act regarding
registration in two distinct ways.53
A. The History of Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com and the Registration
Approach
The registration approach, adopted by the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits,
requires an applicant to show that the Copyright Office issued or rejected an
application for certification before the copyright owner can bring a suit for
copyright infringement.54 The registration approach requires compliance
with strict registration formalities and directs the copyright system towards
a conditional copyright approach.
In Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com, the Eleventh Circuit held copyright
registration occurs when the Copyright Office registers the claim.55 Fourth
Estate filed a complaint against Wall-Street.com for copyright
infringement56 after Wall-Street published material on its website that
49
2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.16(B)(3)(b)(iii) (2018); See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Measuring
Circuit Splits: A Cautionary Note, 3 J. LEGAL METRICS 361, 361 (2014) (“[A] split of authority is
probably the single most important factor in triggering Supreme Court review.”).
50
See Brief of The Copyright Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 3, Fourth Estate
Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571) (praising the Court for
resolving the circuit split).
51
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d 1338, 1339–40 (11th Cir.
2017); Tate, supra note 48, at 138.
52
Tate, supra note 48, at 138.
53
The Supreme Court has in the past affirmed the Eleventh Circuit in 47.4% of cases that have been
granted certiorari, while the Court has affirmed the Fifth and Ninth Circuits 22.2% and 10.8%,
respectively. Eric Hansford, Note, Measuring the Effects of Specialization with Circuit Split Resolutions,
63 STAN. L. REV. 1145, 1165 (2011).
54
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 856 F.3d at 1340.
55
Id. at 1339. Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation is an organization that advocates for free
press and promotes public interest and journalism. Our Vision, Mission & Values, FOURTH EST.,
https://www.fourthestate.org/mission-vision-values-beliefs/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2019). The
organization also uses litigation as a strategy to propel their mission. Public Policy Advocacy, FOURTH
EST., https://www.fourthestate.org/public-policy-advocacy/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2019).
56
A claim for copyright infringement “occurs when a copyrighted work is reproduced, distributed,
performed, publicly displayed, or made into a derivative work without the permission of the copyright
owner.” Definitions, COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-definitions.html (last
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Fourth Estate owned without proper licensure. Fourth Estate filed an
application for registration with the Register but did not have a certificate
from the Copyright Office before filing the action against Wall-Street.58
The Eleventh Circuit held the defendant’s rationale under the
registration approach was the correct interpretation of section 411(a) and
that the text of the Act was unambiguous.59 In reaching its conclusion, the
court relied on the language of section 410(a), which states “after
examination, the Register of Copyrights determines that . . . [if] the material
deposited constitutes copyrightable subject matter . . . , the Register shall
register the claim and issue to the applicant a certificate of registration under
the seal of the Copyright Office.”60 Therefore, the court held “[f]iling an
application does not amount to registration.”61
B. The Application Approach
The application approach, adopted by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits,62
focused on the copyright owner’s action of filing the application and paying
the required fees in order to bring a suit for copyright infringement, rather
than the steps taken by the Copyright Office.63 The application approach
leans towards a more flexible copyright system.
In Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp., the Ninth Circuit
considered whether a district court erred in dismissing the plaintiff’s
copyright infringement action because it allegedly failed to satisfy section
411(a) of the Copyright Act.64 Prior to filing suit, Cosmetic submitted an
application for copyright registration to the Copyright Office, but had not
yet heard from the Office regarding whether its application was approved.65
The Ninth Circuit considered what “registration” means within the larger
context of the Act.66 The court considered both the application and

visited Mar. 21, 2019). To prevail on a claim of copyright infringement, the copyright owner must prove
both “[o]wnership of a valid copyright in the work” and “the defendant copied the work.” PRACTICAL
LAW INTELLECTUAL PROP. & TECH., COPYRIGHT: OVERVIEW, Westlaw (last updated 2018). There is a
three-year statute of limitations. 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2012).
57
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 856 F.3d at 1339. “[L]icensing is a crucial mechanism for
transferring rights from authors to [other] entities . . . .” Sprigman, supra note 1, at 502. Wall-Street.com
provides information relating to the financial sector, stocks, and news. WALL-STREET.COM, https://wallstreet.com (last visited Mar. 21, 2019).
58
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 887 (2019).
59
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 856 F.3d at 1340–42.
60
17 U.S.C. § 410(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
61
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 856 F.3d at 1341.
62
Id. at 1340.
63
Id.
64
606 F.3d 612, 613–14 (9th Cir. 2010).
65
Id. at 614.
66
Id. at 615.
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registration approaches and recognized the circuit split on this issue. Since
litigation began, the Copyright Office issued a certificate of registration to
the plaintiff.68 The circuit court focused on the language of section 411(a)
and stated that “registration” is not well defined in the Act.69 Therefore, the
court interpreted multiple sections of the Act in order to get guidance on the
appropriate definition of “registration.”70 The court noted that if section
410(a) or section 411(a) are considered alone, it appears that the Register
has an active role that requires action in order to complete registration.71
However, when considered alongside sections 408 and 410(d), it seems that
the intention of Congress was to follow the application approach.72 In
addition to considering the language of the Copyright Act, the Ninth Circuit
also contemplated Congress’ intent in passing the Act. The court held that
the “application approach better fulfill[ed] Congress’s purpose of providing
broad copyright protection while maintaining a robust federal register.”73
The Fifth Circuit, in Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money Records
Inc., relied on the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Cosmetic Ideas and concluded
that “technicalities should not prevent litigants from having their cases heard
on the merits.”74 The Fifth Circuit adopted the application approach through
this opinion.
Ultimately, the facts surrounding Fourth Estate’s claim are different
from the facts in Cosmetic Ideas. Unlike Cosmetic, Fourth Estate did not
receive confirmation from the Copyright Office regarding the status of its
application when it appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.75 Therefore, the
Eleventh Circuit did not have the same benefit the Ninth Circuit had—
holding a valid copyright registration. However, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits
provided the Supreme Court with a strong statutory analysis that could have
been used as a baseline for its decision in Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com.
Further, both the Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit considered the language
of the Act regarding the definition of “registration” to be ambiguous.76
67

Id. at 615–16.
Id. at 616. Registration with the Copyright Office is prima facie evidence of a valid copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (2012).
69
Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 616.
70
Id. (“[R]ather than focusing just on the word or phrase at issue, this court looks to the entire
statute to determine . . . intent.”).
71
Id. at 617.
72
Id. (“[Section 408] implies that the sole requirement for obtaining registration is delivery of the
appropriate documents and fee.”).
73
Id. at 619.
74
Positive Black Talk Inc. v. Cash Money Records Inc., 394 F.3d 357, 366 (5th Cir. 2004).
75
In fact, Fourth Estate’s application was significantly delayed. See Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit
Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 887 n.2 (2019) (“Consideration of Fourth Estate’s filings
was initially delayed because the check Fourth Estate sent in payment of the filing fee was rejected by
Fourth Estate’s bank as uncollectible.”).
76
See Cosmetic Ideas, 606 F.3d at 618; Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit
Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571) (“[R]egistration could mean either.”).
68
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Since arguing before the Eleventh Circuit, Fourth Estate’s application
for copyright registration was denied.77 The Register found that Fourth
Estate failed to meet the group database registration requirements.78
However, the Register’s decision did not impact the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction over this case. First, the defendant prevailed on its motion to
dismiss, depriving the petitioner the opportunity to present evidence as to
why its application for copyright should have been approved. Second, the
Register’s denial of a copyright application does not deprive the petitioner
its day in court under section 411(a). While this section may now require
that the Register approve or deny issuing a certificate of copyright, it does
not require that the Register issue a certificate in order to bring suit.79 The
Register also has the option to become a party in an action regarding the
registrability of a copyright claim.80
III. THE APPEAL TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court previously acknowledged the circuit split regarding
copyright registration but has refused to address this issue until granting
certiorari in Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com.81 In Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.
Muchnick, the Court considered “whether [section] 411(a) . . . deprives
federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate infringement
claims involving unregistered works.”82 The Court conducted a close
reading of section 411(a) and considered the legislative intent in drafting the
statute.83 The Court held that registration is not a condition to jurisdiction.84
However, the Court did not reach the issue of defining “registration” as
applied to section 411.85 While this decision signaled that the copyright
77

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 10, Fourth Estate Pub.
Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571). Fourth Estate’s application
was delayed because of a check that was uncollectible. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at
887 n.2.
78
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 77, at 3a–7a
(citing lack of originality in arranging materials). A single application for registration may be submitted
for a group of works created by the same author and published in a periodical or newspaper in the same
year. 17 U.S.C. § 408(c) (2012).
79
§ 411(a).
80
Id.
81
The Court acknowledged the circuit split early in the Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com decision,
stating the purpose of granting certiorari in this case was to resolve the split. Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit
Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 887.
82
130 S. Ct. 1237, 1242 (2010).
83
Id. at 1245.
84
Id. at 1246–47.
85
Id. at 1249 (“We also decline to address whether § 411(a)’s registration requirement is a
mandatory precondition to suit that . . . district courts may or should enforce sua sponte by dismissing
copyright infringement claims involving unregistered works.”). However, had the Court addressed the
meaning of “registration” in its analysis in this context, the circuit split may have been resolved nearly a
decade ago.
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system was shifting further away from formal registration requirements and
towards a semi-conditional copyright framework, the Court did not take the
same approach when deciding Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com.
On January 8, 2019, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Fourth
Estate v. Wall-Street.com.86 Unlike the argument before the Eleventh
Circuit,87 Justice Kagan noted that the term “registration” was flexible.88 The
Court conducted a statutory analysis and focused on the language of the
Copyright Act in order to determine how “registration” should be
interpreted.
A. Petitioner’s Brief and Argument Before the United States Supreme
Court
Justices of the Court agreed with Petitioner that the definition of
“registration” was flexible89 and asserted “registration” could mean either
the copyright owner’s application or the Copyright Office’s processing of
the application.90 The Court’s acknowledgement that the term “registration”
was vague was significant because this stance differed significantly from the
Eleventh Circuit’s opinion.
In Petitioner’s brief to the Supreme Court, Fourth Estate asserted that
while a copyright owner must register its work with the Copyright Office in
order to pursue a civil action, there is no requirement that the Copyright
Office must act on that application prior to the copyright owner being able
to protect its work against infringers through a civil action.91 Therefore,
registration is not a precondition to copyright protection.92 Petitioner argued
that when the three basic requirements for copyright protection—deposit,
86

Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC,
139 S. Ct. 881, 887 (2019) (No. 17-571).
87
The argument before the Eleventh Circuit, which took place on April 4, 2017, was vastly different
from the argument before the Supreme Court. Instead of conducting a textual analysis, the Eleventh
Circuit focused on precedent and cases that addressed similar issues. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
district court’s holding and stated “[f]iling an application does not amount to registration.” Fourth Estate
Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 856 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11th Cir. 2017).
88
Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC,
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571).
89
Id.
90
Id. at 4.
91
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 1, 18 (“[T]he registration requirement in § 411(a) imposes
an obligation on the copyright owner to file for registration before initiating suit; it does not require any
particular action by the Register.”). Therefore, Petitioner urges the Court to adopt the application
approach. Several organizations supported Petitioner’s argument, including the American Bar
Association, Copyright Alliance, National Music Publishers’ Association, Authors Guild and Other
Artists Rights Organizations, and International Trademark Association. Search Results: Docket, No.
17-571, U.S. SUP. CT., https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html
/public/17-571.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2019) (listing the briefs amici curiae of the petitioner’s
supporters).
92
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 2, 18.
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application, and fee—have been fulfilled, registration under section 411(a)
is satisfied.93
In its brief, Petitioner interpreted the Copyright Act as a whole, citing to
several sections of the Act, and argued the terms “register” and
“registration” have “substantial flexibility.”94 Section 408 states that “the
owner of copyright . . . may obtain registration of the copyright claim by
delivering to the Copyright Office the deposit specified by this section,
together with the application and fee.”95 Nowhere in section 408 of the Act
does it state that the Register must approve the application in order for it to
take effect for purposes of filing actions for remedies. Additionally, based
on the context of “register” in section 411, Petitioner argued that the word
refers not to the actions of the Register, but to the actions of the copyright
owner.96 Petitioner strengthened its argument by showing that the Register’s
refusal to issue a certificate of registration to a copyright owner does not
preclude the owner from being able to initiate an infringement action.97
Therefore, regardless of whether the registration for copyright is granted or
refused, the owner may still initiate a suit for infringement.98
Further, Petitioner cited to several problems that would ensue and the
obstacles copyright owners would face if the Court adopted the registration
approach. Petitioner contended that if the Act was interpreted to require the
Register to determine the copyrightability of a work prior to a copyright
owner being able to bring an infringement suit, unnecessary delays would
result.99 Petitioner also stated that the most significant problem a copyright
holder will face is their inability to bring an action for injunctive relief, or
any other kind of civil action, until the Register grants or refuses
registration.100 “[T]he value of the copyright depends on the ability to
exclude [the] unauthorized copying [or] reproduction of the work.”101
Injunctive relief is important to a copyright owner because it can prevent
wide dissemination of their work—which in turn reduces the value of the
work—and it can be difficult to determine the amount of damages that
should be awarded.102
Fourth Estate also argued that the registration approach would be
“inconsistent with the scheme of rights and remedies that the Copyright Act
93

Id.
Id. at 28–29.
95
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
96
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 29.
97
17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 29–30.
98
17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2012); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 10.
99
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 12–14 (arguing there are delays due to a backlog in the
Copyright Office). See infra Section V.A (discussing delays within the copyright system).
100
Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC,
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571).
101
Id. at 26.
102
Id. at 27.
94
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103

creates.” Petitioner distinguished the copyright system from the trademark
and patent regimes, which have different registration requirements.104
Applications for trademarks and patents involve a complex process that has
“significant procedural formalities,”105 and unlike these two distinct
regimes, copyright serves a different purpose.106 Therefore, unlike a
trademark or patent, a copyright owner’s right to exclude does not require a
certificate of registration.107
B. Respondents’ Brief and Argument Before the United States Supreme
Court
Respondents argued that section 411(a) of the Act “is plain”108 and
should be interpreted to mean registration must be made or refused before
an infringement action may be instituted.109 Respondents urged the Court to
consider these terms in “their ordinary, common-sense meaning,” in order
to reach the conclusion that “registration” does not mean application.110 “The
whole point of a registration decision, whether it’s a grant or a refusal . . . is
a belief that there is a value to the registration process itself.”111
Wall-Street.com cited to several benefits of registration, including providing

103

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 20–21, 37.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC,
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571) (“[T]he Copyright Office is not the Patent Office. It does not grant
exclusive rights that don’t exist before the Copyright Office acts.”).
105
Jacob Harper, The United States Copyright Office: Nostalgia for the Past, Obstacle for the
Future, 4 INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 29, 30 (2012).
106
Id. at 32 (stating the Copyright Office’s mission is to “promote creativity by administering and
sustaining an effective national copyright system”).
107
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp.
v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571).
108
Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC,
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571).
109
Brief for the Respondents at 1, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139
S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571). Several organizations supported Respondents’ view, including Authors
and Educators, Washington Legal Foundation, and Public Knowledge and the R Street Institute. Docket
No.
17-571,
U.S.
SUP.
CT.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html%20/public/17-571.html
(last visited Mar. 21, 2019). An amicus brief was also filed on behalf of the United States, which is
supported by the General Counsel and Associate Register of Copyrights, Assistant General Counsel of
the United States Copyright Office, and attorneys at the Department of Justice. Id. The Department of
Justice’s support of Respondents’ brief is not surprising. In the Copyright Office’s 2017 Annual Report,
the Office stated that it has “coordinated closely with the Department of Justice to defend the Office’s
actions.”
U.S.
COPYRIGHT
OFFICE,
FISCAL
2017
ANNUAL
REPORT
8,
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/2017/ar2017.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2019).
110
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 109, at 15, 19.
111
Transcript of Oral Argument at 34–35, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com,
LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571).
104
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information to the public, creating a permanent record, incentivizing creators
to register works early, and expanding the Library of Congress’ records.112
Respondents also engaged in a close, textual analysis of section 411(a)
and contended that the language of the Act clearly supports the registration
approach.113 Respondents argued that the second sentence of section 411(a)
is an exception to the first sentence, which showed Congress’ intent in
requiring action by the Register.114 It also engaged in an analysis of other
sections of the Act, such as sections 408, 409, and 410, to further support its
definition of “registration.”115
While Respondents acknowledged the concern surrounding processing
of copyright claims, they minimized its impact.116 Respondents cited to
budget cuts, staff vacancies, and lacking technology as reasons for delays in
registering copyright claims.117 During oral argument, the Court stated that
Congress did not intend for these delays.118 Respondents contended that
works filed for preregistration or under an alternative special handling
process are decided quickly and are not subjected to the same delays.119
While delays in processing claims are one of the Copyright Office’s
concerns, Respondents suggested that this issue should be left to Congress
to resolve.120
IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND THE LIKELY
RESULTS
The Supreme Court “conclude[d] that ‘registration . . . has been made’
within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) not when an application for
registration is filed, but when the Register has registered a copyright after
examining a properly filed application.”121 The Court’s decision clearly
aligned with the registration approach and signals a shift back towards a
conditional copyright, or copyright formalities, system. Ultimately, this
decision will present several obstacles for copyright owners.

112

Brief for the Respondents, supra note 109, at 20; Transcript of Oral Argument at 49–50, Fourth
Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571).
113
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 109, at 14.
114
Id. at 5; Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com,
LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571).
115
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 109, at 14–15.
116
Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC,
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571) (stating ninety-four percent of applications are resolved in two to
fifteen months).
117
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 109, at 4.
118
Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC,
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571).
119
Id. at 38, 40.
120
Brief for the Respondents, supra note 109, at 33.
121
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2019).
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A. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning
First, the Court delved into a textual analysis of the Copyright Act.
While the Court recognized that exclusive rights are automatically granted
to a copyright owner, it also pointed to section 408(f), which allows for
preregistration. Under this provision, copyright owners may file a civil
action for infringement before registering their work.122 However,
preregistration is only available to works that are “vulnerable to
predistribution infringement” and has historically applied to works in the
film or music industries.123 Therefore, while the preregistration section of
the Act does support the Court’s holding under the registration approach,
Fourth Estate would not have likely been able to qualify its works for
preregistration.124 Next, the Court considered the language of section 411(a)
and stated that it focuses on the Copyright Office’s act of registration or
refusal, not on the owner’s action of filing an application.125 Otherwise,
different meanings of “registration” would have to be given to the term in
the first and second sentences within the same section of the Act.126
Additionally, the third sentence, which gives the Register the authority to
intervene, would be negated.127 The Court then turned to other sections of
the Act, stating that sections 410 and 408(f) both support its interpretation
of “registration.”128
Second, the Court stated that amendments to the Copyright Act and
precedent were dispositive. The Court relied on the text of the statute that
anteceded the modern section 411 and the Second Circuit’s holding in
Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co. In
Vacheron, the Second Circuit held that the Copyright Act precluded a
copyright owner from bringing an action for infringement until a work was
both deposited and registered.129 Congress responded to this decision by
122
Id. at 888 (noting that preregistration is just “a preliminary step prior to a full registration” and
is not an exception to the general registration requirement).
123
Id.
124
The Court notes that preregistration is allowed for “exceptional scenarios,” making the
availability of preregistration even narrower. Id.
125
Id. at 888–89.
126
Id. at 889. This analysis closely aligned with Respondents’ position and analysis of section
411(a). Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC,
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571).
127
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 889.
128
Id. (relying on the Register’s role after examination of an application and the ability to preregister
works).
129
Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637, 640–41
(2d Cir. 1958). “[T]he key issue that was debated between the majority opinion and the dissent in
Vacheron [was] whether the copyright owner should be prevented from gaining access to judicial
remedies because the Copyright Office had not yet acted or granted the registration.” Transcript of Oral
Argument at 66, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No.
17-571).
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adding the second sentence of section 411(a), which allows an infringement
suit to move forward, even if an application for registration was denied.130
The parties disagree as to whether Congress’ response was a shift towards
an unconditional or conditional copyright system. The Court rejected the
argument that the amendment shifted registration away from formalities.131
Lastly, the Court considered the legislative history and intent of section
411(a).132 The Court stated that the amendments to the Act in 1976
“reaffirmed the general rule that registration must precede an infringement
suit, and added an exception” by adding the second sentence to section
411(a).133 The Court also cited to rejected proposed amendments to section
411(a), including a “proposal to allow suit immediately upon submission of
a registration application.”134 “Time and again, then, Congress has
maintained registration as prerequisite to suit, and rejected proposals that
would have eliminated registration or tied it to the copyright claimant’s
application instead of the Register’s action.”135 Instead, Congress addressed
concerns by creating clear exceptions from section 411(a)’s registration
requirement.136
While the Supreme Court adopted the registration approach, the Court
acknowledged the “unfortunate” outcome from this decision.137 The Court
noted that the copyright system has not functioned in a way that Congress
likely intended,138 and therefore Congress should respond. Moreover, there
are several obstacles copyright owners who do not yet hold a certificate of
registration will face if they are prevented from filing an infringement suit
before a certificate is issued or denied. These concerns include significant
delays, running of the statute of limitations, and severe economic impacts.
Therefore, Congress should amend the Act to create an additional exception
to section 411(a) by adopting the special handling process offered by the
Copyright Office.139

130

Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 891 n.5.
Id. at 890–91.
132
Id. “Time and again, then, Congress has maintained registration as prerequisite to suit, and
rejected proposals that would have eliminated registration or tied it to the copyright claimant’s
application instead of the Register’s action.” Id. at 891.
133
Id. at 890–91.
134
Id. at 891 (“[I]n years following the 1976 revisions, Congress resisted efforts to eliminate §
411(a) and the registration requirement embedded in it.”).
135
Id.
136
Id. at 892 (providing examples such as section 408(f)’s preregistration option).
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
In fact, Respondents contended that Congress must amend the Copyright Act for a court to find
that the application approach satisfies the registration requirement under section 411(a). Brief for the
Respondents, supra note 109, at 42.
131
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B. The Likely Ramifications of the Supreme Court’s Decisions
1. Delays Within the Copyright System
The largest impact of the Supreme Court’s decision is its implicit
tolerance of the dysfunctional registration system. The Court characterized
the Copyright Office’s delay in registering copyright applications as
“unfortunate” and stated that the registration system has not worked as it
was meant to.140 However, the Court left this issue for Congress to resolve.
The Copyright Office is entrusted with the important responsibility of
registering copyright claims.141 In 2018, the Copyright Office received over
600,000 claims.142 In 2017, the Office received 539,662 claims and issued
452,122 certificates of registration.143 According to the 2017 annual report
published by the Copyright Office, 15,902 applications were not processed
in the year they were filed.144 Due to the large volume of applications, “[i]t
is therefore crucial that the Office have an innovative and modern copyright
registration system that can meet the rapidly expanding needs of the highly
diverse copyright community and the public at large.”145 It is clear that the
Copyright Office cannot process applications as quickly as some copyright
owners may need in order to pursue litigation. The Office recognized “that
a delay in the issuance of a certificate may create difficulties for the
copyright owner or other interested parties, particularly when litigation is
expected.”146 The registration approach tolerates and creates further
unnecessary delays within the system.147 The Copyright Office estimates the
following processing times:148
Type of Claim
Claims filed online with no
correspondence
Claims filed by mail with no

Average Processing Time
Six months
Thirteen months

140
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 892. Wall-Street.com acknowledged in its brief
to the Supreme Court that the amount of time it takes for the Copyright Office to process an application
for registration has fluctuated and varies. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 109, at 4 (“The pendency
time for processing registration claims is a source of constant concern.”).
141
Registration Modernization, 83 Fed. Reg. 52,336 (proposed Oct. 17, 2018) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 201–02) (“Copyright registration provides essential benefits for copyright owners.”).
142
Id. at 52,337.
143
Id.
144
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 109, at 4 (reporting that the Registration Program received
539,662 claims in fiscal year 2017 and closed 523,760).
145
Registration Modernization, 83 Fed. Reg. at 52,337.
146
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 623.1 (3d ed.
2019) [hereinafter COMPENDIUM].
147
Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 2010); Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 14, at 2.
148
Registration
Processing
Times,
U.S.
COPYRIGHT
OFF.,
https://www.copyright.gov/registration/docs/processing-times-faqs.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2019).
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Nine months
Twenty months

Therefore, on average, the process is likely to take nine to thirteen
months.149 According to the Department of Justice, “[t]he examination
process often involves a dialogue between the copyright office and the
applicant,”150 which leads to increased processing time. Respondents stated
that thirty percent of applications result in correspondence and the Office
often requests changes to applications,151 which also suggests increased
processing time. While there are alternatives, such as expedited review
through the special handling process,152 not all copyright owners can afford
additional fees.153 Despite these delays, ninety-seven percent of applications
for registration are ultimately approved.154
In addition to severe delays, the Copyright Office also fails to
communicate with copyright owners during the application process.155 The
Office does not have information available to applicants regarding the
amount of time it will take to review an application or register a work.156 The
period of time between the filing of copyright registration and the
confirmation that registration is complete is referred to as “legal limbo.”157
As a result, the copyright owner lacks important information it may need to

149
But see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 77, at
5 (stating that “[t]he average time for the Copyright Office to resolve a registration application is
approximately seven months”).
150
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
151
Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC,
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571).
152
See infra Section V; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
supra note 77, at 5.
153
Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 28–29, Fourth Estate
Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571) (“The net result is that
authors who cannot afford the special handling fees may be deprived of the ability to obtain recourse for
infringement of their rights.”). The special handling fee is $800 in addition to the general registration fee.
Fees, COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright.gov/about/fees.html (last visited July 20, 2019).
154
Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC,
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571).
155
According to the Copyright Office, there is no confirmation that an application for registration
has been received. I’ve Submitted My Application, Fee, and Copy of My Work to the Copyright Office.
Now What?, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-what.html#received (last
visited Feb. 15, 2019).
156
Id.
157
Duey, supra note 36, at 557. See also Tate, supra note 48, at 144 (“[T]he copyright owner has
no recourse against continuing harmful infringement.”).
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protect its work. Fourth Estate stated that this period of “legal limbo” is the
greatest concern for copyright owners.158
The Copyright Office is taking several measures to improve its current
application process.159 For instance, the Office is seeking to improve its
technology, increase the types of documents it retains in its public database,
and is considering implementing a system that offers varying amounts of
support throughout the application process.160 These improvements would
create more transparency in the registration process, simplify the application
process, and likely improve the Copyright Office’s productivity, thereby
reducing the amount of time it takes to process an application for copyright
registration. However, until these changes are implemented, applicants will
continue to be disadvantaged by delays and prejudiced by the lack of
information available regarding their applications.
The Supreme Court’s reaction to this issue was lacking. The Court cited
to section 408(f), which allows preregistration for works that are susceptible
to infringement.161 However, the works that qualify under section 408(f) are
limited, as they must be the type “especially susceptible to prepublication
infringement.”162 The Court left the administrative delays for Congress to
resolve, stating it is not an issue the Court can address.163
2. Access to Courts and Statute of Limitations
The American Bar Association, in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court,
asserted that the registration approach would be an obstacle to accessing
courts.164 Since the Copyright Office does not provide applicants with status
updates on their copyright registration applications, it could be conceivable
that the statute of limitations may run on a claim prior to when the Copyright
Office issues a certificate or rejects an application.165 In considering which
approach to adopt, the Ninth Circuit stated that the registration approach
could have the result of precluding a plaintiff from pursuing a claim due to
the three-year statute of limitations.166 The circuit court also noted that the
statute of limitations conflicts with the requirement under section 410(d) that
158
Transcript of Oral Argument at 20, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC,
139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571).
159
Registration Modernization, 83 Fed. Reg. 52,336 (proposed Oct. 17, 2018) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 201–02).
160
Id.
161
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2019).
162
Id. Fourth Estate would not have likely qualified for preregistration under section 408(f).
163
Id. at 892.
164
Brief of the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 153, at 3,
29 (“The Copyright Office’s delay in deciding whether to issue or refuse to issue a certificate of
registration also has consequences for meeting the short three-year statute of limitations under the
Copyright Act.”).
165
Tate, supra note 48, at 144.
166
Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp., 606 F.3d 612, 620 (9th Cir. 2010).
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the certificate is dated with the date of application, not the date of
certification.167
The Supreme Court responded to the Petitioner’s concern by asserting it
was “overstated” because the average processing time is seven months.168
The Court reasoned that there is “ample time to sue after the Register’s
decision, even for infringement that began before submission of an
application.”169 However, as previously stated, it may take much longer than
seven months for the Register to act on an application.170
3. Economic Impacts of the Supreme Court’s Decision
The Court’s decision will have significant economic impacts on
copyright owners. The Supreme Court reasoned that a copyright owner, once
issued a certificate of registration, may “recover for infringement that
occurred both before and after registration.”171 However, damages in an
infringement suit are difficult to prove, and the infringement may not be
discovered for a substantial period of time.172 Additionally, copyright
owners will inevitably sustain further damages if they must wait until the
Register acts on their application for copyright registration.173 These
“bureaucratic delays” will “prevent a copyright owner from promptly
enjoining infringement that may significantly undermine the value of its
property.”174 It would also allow “an infringing party to continue to profit”
from violating copyright law.175 This “uneconomic” approach is not in the
interests of the litigating parties or the court system.176
A possible benefit of the Court’s adoption of the registration approach
is that it may encourage artists who anticipate returns on their works to
register with the Copyright Office early.177
The registration requirement thus encourage[s] authors to
assess the value of their works prior to first publication. If the
author expected the work to have a commercial value in excess
of the time-adjusted cost of complying with registration and
other formalities, he would take the steps necessary to obtain
167

Id.
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 892.
169
Id.
170
See supra Section V.A (describing the amount of time it may take for the Copyright Office to
process an application).
171
Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 881.
172
Sprigman, supra note 1, at 513–14 n.97.
173
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com,
LLC, 139 S. Ct. 881 (2019) (No. 17-571) (arguing it is difficult to determine the extent of distribution or
the amount of damage suffered).
174
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 14, at 2.
175
Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v. IAC/Interactivecorp, 606 F.3d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 2010).
176
Duey, supra note 36, at 557.
177
Sprigman, supra note 1, at 514.
168

2020]

THE IMPLICATIONS OF FOURTH ESTATE V. WALL-STREET.COM

473

copyright protection. But if the costs of protection exceeded
the expected revenues from copyrighting, the author would not
register the work.178
However, an artist cannot always predict the commercial success of its work.
V. A POSSIBLE SOLUTION THROUGH THE SPECIAL HANDLING PROCESS
The Supreme Court’s adoption of the registration approach in Fourth
Estate v. Wall-Street.com is severely problematic for copyright owners and
is fundamentally unjust. The Court acknowledged the “unfortunate”
outcome of this case and several issues that will result from this conditional
copyright approach, including delays within the copyright system, possible
running of the statute of limitations, and economic impacts.179 However, the
Court declined to directly address these problems and left them for Congress
to resolve.
Congress may address the inefficiencies within the copyright system and
the outcome of Fourth Estate by amending the Act. Instead of viewing
copyright as a conditional or unconditional system, Congress should amend
the Act to create a semi-conditional copyright system. This approach would
maintain the formal requirement of registration while providing copyright
owners with a practical solution when they do not qualify for preregistration
under section 408(f).
Under the current Act, a court may not hear an infringement action and
cannot issue an injunction until the Register has issued or rejected an
application for copyright registration.180 However, under the Copyright
Office’s Compendium, the Office permits copyright owners to file an
application under an expedited application: the special handling process.181
Congress has not adopted the Compendium as law. Rather, it is a guide for
the Copyright Office.
The “special handling [process] is a procedure for expediting the
examination of an application to register a claim to copyright or the
recordation of a document pertaining to copyright.”182 The Office may grant
an application for special handling under limited circumstances, such as
pending or prospective litigation, and charges an additional $800 fee for the
expedited review in addition to the registration fee.183 The Office aims to
review an application within five business days when filed under this
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process. However, the Copyright Office may deny an application for
special handling based on how busy the Office is or due to budget
restraints.185
Congress should adopt a modified version of section 623 of the
Compendium, which outlines the special handling process, into the Act in
order to codify a semi-conditional copyright system. Like section 408(f), this
would provide another exception to the general registration requirement and
allow parties anticipating litigation to pursue an infringement action in a
timely manner. However, Congress should not allow the Office to decline
review of an application under the expedited system due to the Office’s
volume of applications.186 This would otherwise undermine the purpose of
the special handling process and create uncertainty for applicants regarding
whether and when their application would be processed. Additionally,
Congress should explicitly state how section 623 would operate in litigation.
Under the proposed semi-conditional system, a district court would grant a
temporary restraining order, prohibiting the alleged infringer from
continuing the infringing behavior until the copyright owner has an
opportunity to amend its copyright registration application with the
Copyright Office and request review under the special handling process.187
This approach would limit the damages the copyright owner suffers, reduce
litigation costs, and would resolve many of the concerns Petitioner in Fourth
Estate and the Supreme Court acknowledge.
First, the adoption of the special handling process into the Act would
help to resolve the “legal limbo” concern as well as resolve some of the
Copyright Office’s delays. By allowing a copyright owner to modify its
application to pursue the special handling process, the copyright owner
would not need to worry about waiting a significant amount of time for the
Register to process an application and issue a certificate.188 Instead, the
applicant would have a near-immediate decision from the Register. This
approach would also increase communication between the copyright owner
and the Office: the Office would be on notice of the litigation and may
therefore gain more information about the work.
184
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Second, the special handling process would preserve the registration
requirement as a formality under the Act while maintaining access to
courts.189 By expediting an application through the special handling process,
the copyright owner would not be concerned about running into the statute
of limitations, since a decision would be made within five business days.190
As a result, the owner could commence an infringement action almost
immediately and would not be prejudiced by the running of the statute of
limitations.
Finally, a semi-conditional copyright approach would resolve many of
the uneconomic effects of the Court’s decision. It would allow the copyright
owner to pursue an expedited review of its application for copyright,
therefore mitigating the amount of damages the plaintiff would otherwise
suffer in the number of months it would otherwise take the Copyright Office
to act on its application. While the applicant may have to pay a fee in order
to expedite an application,191 it would likely be less than what the applicant
would suffer due to continued infringement. This approach would also
reduce litigation costs, as the parties would be able to quickly adjudicate the
infringement action.
Through the adoption of the special handling process, Congress can
relieve many of the concerns raised by Fourth Estate and circuit courts. The
Compendium provides Congress a foundation upon which to build this semiconditional copyright system and would provide copyright owners with a
sword to protect their works should litigation ensue.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Fourth Estate v. Wall-Street.com
signals a shift within the copyright regime. This decision demonstrates a
shift back towards the copyright formalities that Congress imposed upon
copyright owners in early iterations of copyright acts. While the Acts of
1909 and 1976 transitioned the copyright system towards an unconditional
approach, the Supreme Court and Congress clearly intended for registration
to remain a formal requirement that was necessary to bring an infringement
action.
However, the Supreme Court’s decision will have numerous impacts on
copyright owners. While this decision will incentivize copyright owners to
file for registration early, it will likely have the impact of further congesting
the Copyright Office’s registration system. Therefore, regardless of whether
189
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Congress acts and amends the Copyright Act, the Copyright Office needs to
change its current processing system. Whether this is through technology
updates or increased staffing, it is evident that Congress did not intend for
owners of works to wait a year for a decision on an application that is likely
to be approved.
While the Court’s decision clearly supports the registration approach,
the system should move towards a more balanced methodology. The
adoption of a semi-conditional copyright system, through the special
handling process, would likely alleviate many of the concerns raised by
Petitioner while still maintaining the registration requirement. A
semi-conditional system would allow applicants to update their applications
to an expedited review if litigation is looming or they are being detrimentally
affected by infringers.
Congress would not need to recreate the wheel, but instead adopt a
modified version of section 623 of the Copyright Office’s Compendium. By
working together with the Copyright Office, Congress should amend the
Copyright Act in order to align it to what is occurring in practice and
incorporate options allowed by the Copyright Office.
Ultimately, organizations such as Fourth Estate will need to lobby for
Congress to amend the Copyright Act. It is unlikely that Congress will
amend the Copyright Act so significantly otherwise. Copyright issues are
not likely a primary concern of most legislators in this political climate.
Therefore, in order to achieve a semi-conditional copyright approach,
Congress will need to be persuaded.

